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U.S. COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE AND INSURGENT INFRASTRUCTURES: PROSCRIBED FAILURE?

A Monograph
by

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ABSTRACT

How well does U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine tactically neutralize insurgent infrastructures? This question is important given the high interest of the United States in maintaining stable democracies around the world. Insurgency continues to present the most prevalent type of warfare since the creation of political states. Current National Security Strategy cites many counterinsurgencies for which our military forces must prepare. Defense experts routinely highlight counterinsurgency as one of the contingencies on the operational continuum most likely for future U.S. military involvement.

But, U.S. insurgency/counterinsurgency doctrine displays a dangerous paradox. Doctrine for U.S. support of insurgencies highlights the paramount importance of building strong insurgent infrastructures. But, U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine eschews our involvement in the tactical neutralization of these infrastructures. Citing vague "historic experience", our counter-insurgency doctrine posits popular support as the insurgent's center of gravity, leaving less important infrastructure neutralization to host nation forces.

Both insurgents and theorists appear to disagree with this view. Successful insurgents view their infrastructures as one of their centers of gravity, perhaps the most important prerequisite for victory. Theorists, supporting this thesis, emphasize the importance of offensive action by the counter-insurgents. Furthermore, contemporary experience of counterinsurgency nations supports the tactical neutralization of insurgent infrastructures.

The counterinsurgency experiences of Britain-Malaysia, France-Algeria, U.S.-Vietnam, and Britain-Northern Ireland provide a valid criteria against which we can judge the effectiveness of our own counter-insurgency doctrine. Each of these counterinsurgent nations found it necessary to develop tactics for the neutralization of insurgent infrastructures. These tactics fell into four categories: separation of the population from insurgents; intelligence collection; resource control; and deterrence.

The United States must develop acceptable and effective tactics in each category except deterrence. Most forms of deterrence, used in counterinsurgency, are repugnant to American values. They create more insurgents than they eliminate. We must preserve the balanced approach to counterinsurgency; but, that balance must include effective tactical neutralization of insurgent infrastructures.

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INTRODUCTION

Insurgencies arguably present the most prevalent type of warfare since the creation of political states. Rising from internal political violence, rebellion, uprising, and revolution insurgencies abound throughout history. (25:795) Caesar encountered insurgents in Gaul and Germany. A ferocious Spanish insurgency against Napoleon in the 19th century added the term "guerrilla" to the military lexicon. (23:6) Since our own nation's birth in rebellion, the United States has been involved with insurgency warfare. Though occasionally this nation has supported insurgencies, most of our experience has been in support of the status quo through counterinsurgency.

U.S. counterinsurgency efforts abroad began at the turn of this century. Our counterinsurgency interest in the Philippines started upon their ceding from Spain in 1898 and continues today. The United States pursued counterinsurgency objectives in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua throughout the first half of this century. This counterinsurgency interest in the Caribbean and Latin America continues. For over twenty years the United States vainly fought insurgent revolution in Vietnam. This failure caused the United States to withdrawal from entanglement in foreign insurrections. American counterinsurgency policy,

henceforth, provided advice and assistance but eschewed any U.S. military involvement. (25:796)

But, transnational terrorism, the overthrow of the Shah of Iran, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan awakened U.S. interest in insurgent conflicts. Reagan Administration concerns about revolutionary insurgencies in El Salvador and Guatemala increased our interest in counterinsurgency. (25:797) Current National Security Strategy cites counterinsurgency concerns throughout the globe, for which our armed forces must prepare. (3:28) In the operational continuum, counterinsurgency represents one of the highest probabilities for U.S. involvement. Throughout this century, political concerns for counterinsurgency have prompted the U.S. military to develop counter-insurgency doctrine.

Perhaps the earliest attempt to document what has become counterinsurgency warfare was Colonel C.E. Calwell's, "Small Wars- Their Principles and Practice". This extensive study, written in 1906, documented military counterinsurgency actions back to the Little Big Horn. (19:10) Marines used it, along with their own extensive counterinsurgency experience, to publish the Small Wars Manual in 1940. This manual, called "one of the finest documents written on counterinsurgency before World War II", contains many of the essential elements of today's Internal Defense and Development

Strategy. (19:10)

The Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) Strategy governs U.S. counterinsurgency efforts. It covers the full range of measures taken by a nation to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. The IDAD Strategy focuses on promoting the growth of viable government institutions, responsive to the needs of their society. IDAD turns on the premise that insurgencies can be defeated by removing any legitimate cause of the insurgents. (31:2-13)

IDAD concentrates on civil programs, which promote growth through balanced political, economic, and social programs. The IDAD Strategy assumes popular support as the shared center of gravity, for both the insurgents and the government. Hence, government military activity, even though it may contain a tactical neutralization effort, must be circumscribed to minimize collateral damage on the general population. Tactical military action focuses on internal security with a minimum use of force. (31:2-16) This proscription profoundly impacts on U.S. counter-insurgency doctrine.

Though effective counterinsurgency programs do require a balanced approach, the IDAD strategy may underestimate the requirement for effective tactical military action. First, the IDAD Strategy presumes that all insurgencies arise from legitimate social causes.

It then assumes that the insurgency will fail if these legitimate causes are preempted or removed. The logic, here, is based on the notion that popular support comprises the insurgent's only center of gravity.

But many authors on insurgency and counterinsurgency disagree with this notion. They propose the insurgent's infrastructures as the insurgent's true center of gravity. These infrastructures provide for the complete strategic, operational, and tactical direction of the insurgency. If true, U.S. tactical counterinsurgency doctrine, based on the IDAD Strategy, may not effectively deal with insurgent infrastructures.

This monograph seeks to answer the question: How well does U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine tactically neutralize insurgent infrastructures?

This question is important because experts consistently view counterinsurgency, and other low intensity conflict missions, as the most probable for future U.S. military involvement. Increased Third World sophistication with chemical weapons and nuclear weapons proliferation serve to increase the stakes of insurgency around the world. Finally, current U.S. problems in counterterrorism and counternarcotics share with counterinsurgency the problem of tactical neutralization of infrastructures.

The next section of this monograph presents an

analysis of three important insurgent revolutions of the 20th century: the October 1917 Revolution in Russia; the Communist Revolution in China, and the Communist Revolution in Vietnam. Using Marxist-Leninist doctrine and the works of Mao and Ho Chi Minh, this study will demonstrate the importance that insurgents place on their own infrastructures.

The third section of the monograph analyzes the works of military theorists studied at the School of Advanced Military Studies. This purpose is to extract any insight or benefit from theory on the counterinsurgency problem.

Next, the study reviews U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine. It seeks to determine how we expect to effectively neutralize insurgent infrastructures at the tactical level.

The fifth section of the monograph presents the criteria for effectiveness. This criteria consists of those effective tactical neutralization measures found necessary by other nation's military forces, while combatting insurgencies. These criteria were developed from analysis of the following counterinsurgency examples: Britain-Malaysia; France-Algeria; U.S.-Vietnam; and Britain-Northern Ireland.

The final section compares the criteria with U.S. doctrine for the tactical neutralization of insurgent infrastructures and presents conclusions. This section

illuminates how well we are prepared for counterinsurgency operations by answering the research question: How well does U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine tactically neutralize insurgent infrastructures?

INSURGENTS' VIEWS ON INFRASTRUCTURES

Insurgents view their own infrastructures as one of their centers of gravity, perhaps the most important prerequisite for victory. (5:10) Political and military infrastructures initiate and sustain insurgencies at each level of war. Regardless of category, organization, or phase of insurgency, the infrastructures provide the discipline, plans and leadership required for success. Each major contributor to the theory and practice of modern insurgency and revolutionary war highlighted this importance.

Insurgencies normally fall into three categories based on the insurgent objective: national liberation; social revolution; or separatist movement. (5:11) Insurgencies based on national liberation involve a move to expel a foreign power or influence. Social revolutions turn on a substantial injustice and often result in civil wars. Separatist insurgencies struggle for the succession of a homogenous ethnic or religious minority. The ultimate goal of each category is political change. The infrastructures articulate this change and organize the tactical forces for it. The driving ideology in each case is nationalism. (5:2) Successful leadership organizes to strike this chord.

Insurgencies normally organize along one of two

lines: conspiratorial or mobilizational (25:801). Each requires a dedicated, highly organized cadre. The difference between the two involves the degree of mass movement required by the insurgent situation. The Leninist and Foco models of insurgency relied on the former method of organization. Mao and the Vietnamese *dau tranh* model epitomized the mobilizational organization. Regardless of organization, insurgencies normally progress through four phases.

These four phases are usually characterized by the tactics employed: propaganda, terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and mobile warfare. (25:815) But these phases also can be differentiated by the degree of infrastructure organization, which makes the increasingly violent tactics possible. Throughout the insurgency, organization is actually more important than ideology or military tactics. Seizing power by disabling society provides the constant focus of the organizational effort. (24:220)

The first two phases, propaganda and terrorism, concentrate on building the political infrastructure. Propaganda and basic organizing activity characterize the initial phase. The trusted cadre forms and pays special attention to recruiting from the intelligentsia. For security, both the conspiratorial and mobilizational organizations develop cellularly during this first phase.

Terrorism characterizes the second phase. By demonstrating government weakness and insurgent tactical strength, the insurgent hopes to gain popular support. (25:806) His primary goal is to alter the behavior and attitudes of targeted groups. (25:802) He creates concern among those segments of the population, who are otherwise satisfied. (30:3-24) Provoking a disproportionate government response serves as an alternate goal. (25:806) His organization now contains highly compartmented strike forces and he begins to recruit from the wider segment of the middle class. His immediate organizational goals are to solidify the growing infrastructure and expand his resource base. (30:3-14) Throughout these first two phases, propaganda and terrorism focus on organization not agitation. (5:15)

Guerrilla warfare characterizes the third phase of an insurgency. Mobile, lightly armed tactical forces target government troops. This traditional weapon of the weak normally succeeds militarily only where government response is inadequate. (25:803) By proving the government's inability to obtain battlefield success, the insurgents widen their military base. Mobilizational organizations begin to establish parallel government cadres at every level. Propaganda continues. Insurgents depict their own aggression as liberation and characterize government response as a

protraction of the conflict. (24:219) Successfully active guerrilla operations sustain the morale of the fighting forces and expand their ranks for the final phase of insurgency.

Mobile conventional warfare is supported not just by large military forces but more importantly by a complete and total political infrastructure. The insurgency is now more like a civil war or even a war between nation states. Once the insurgent reaches this stage, defeat looms large for the government. Three great revolutions of the twentieth century highlight the importance of infrastructure, through each phase of insurgency.

The Communist Revolutions of Russia, China, and Vietnam serve as models for most contemporary insurgent situations. They represent the most successful insurgencies of the 20th century and provided innovative contributions to the art of insurgency. The success of the Marxist-Lenist revolution in Russia proved the importance of a highly organized vanguard element. Mao demonstrated the revolutionary potential of mobilizing the agrarian masses. In Vietnam the *dau tranh* strategy proved the power of political and military mobilization of every member of a society. Each of these successful models demonstrated the overriding importance of insurgent infrastructures for the strategic, operational, and tactical direction of

insurgencies. A forth example, the Foco model failed everywhere but Cuba, precisely because it scorned this importance.

The first great revolution of the 20th century marked the beginning of Soviet Russia. Lenin successfully founded his revolution on a small, well disciplined, well organized, conspiratorial group. His revolution required no mass mobilization because the class dialectic of history would destroy the government. (30:3-6) The struggle "captured" these ready masses and controlled them with an "Iron party". (4:187) But the masses were used for the will of the party, not vice versa.

For Lenin, the leadership struggled for power not ideology. Once in power, he used revolutionary ideology and cited the threat of counterrevolution to remain in power. (4:96) This required a strong infrastructure as the most important element of the revolution. Strict discipline crushed any "fractionalism" or dissent. (4:190) The narrowly organized party focused on almost unitary leadership. (4:191) Lenin wanted his new order to perform all of the coercive functions of the old regime. (4:181)

The center of gravity of this revolution was clearly the revolutionary vanguard. Lenin felt that revolution could only be made with a central, well disciplined party. (4:185) The force of history would

mobilize the masses. He greatly feared the vanguard's loss of leadership to a "Red Napoleon". (24:146) Therefore, the party needed to galvanize both political and military control of the state. All subsequent communist revolutions built on Lenin's October 1917 model. (4:172)

The second great revolution of the 20th century occurred in China. Mao's greatest innovation to revolutionist thought used the agrarian, Asian masses to support the revolution. (30:3-17) He recognized that China's general situation differed from that of October 1917, so he adopted the required mobilizational organization.

Mao recognized that his mobilizational revolution required a long protracted war. (18:191) Not only did the formidable enemy situation require this, but he also needed a more extensive organizational effort to mobilize the masses. His war required centralized strategic planning and direction of operations and battles. (18:184) The leadership would maintain the "total war objective" through three stages of warfare: guerrilla, mobile operations and conventional. (18:193)

Often cited as the source of the notion that the people are the center of gravity to an insurgency, Mao did not believe this. His commonly quoted analogy claimed the insurgent's need to move through the people as the fish through the sea. But he clearly saw his own

infrastructure as his true center of gravity. Like Lenin, he believed that only one leadership, the communist party, could bring victory. (18:90) Also like Lenin, Mao focused political and military authority in that one leadership. (18:92) Furthermore, Mao recognized the destruction of the regular army as the enemy's center of gravity.

For Mao, the true aim of war was "to preserve oneself and to destroy the enemy". (18:230) To do this the enemy must be disarmed and deprived of his means to resist. The center of gravity that Mao wished to preserve was his infrastructure, not the people. The people merely provided an "inexhaustible supply of resources for the requirements of war". (18:240) For this reason they were the richest source of power to wage war. (18:260) Time was on the side of the insurgency, not because of the people, but because his infrastructure would be preserved. The infrastructure would enable him to absorb tactical setbacks by flowing from one tactical stage of insurgent warfare to another.

The final great revolution of the 20th century triumphed in Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh and the other architects of the *dau tranh* strategy of revolution for Vietnam, sought to forge an entire people as an instrument of war. They fought to control the people, forge them into a weapon, then hurl them into

battle.(24:20) But Ho did not rank support of the people as the first prerequisite for insurgent victory. He valued organization, time and terrain much more. (24:219) Once again the infrastructure valued the people only as expendable resources with which to wage war.(24:215) Ho extolled the legacy of Lenin for providing the organizational principles, theory, and tactics of a revolutionary party. (8:284)

The infrastructures of this revolutionary party forged a weapon of people with a combination of political and military *dau tranh*, which they saw as "systematic coercive activity".(24:217) This armed struggle eliminated anyone as a simple on-looker. It forced all to contribute to the struggle. (24:215) But once again the true center of gravity of the revolution was the political and military infrastructures. How could the U.S. win every battle and still lose the war? Defeat of armed *dau tranh* was not enough; political *dau tranh* must be defeated also. As long as the infrastructure survived, the struggle continued at each level of war.(24:222)

One exception, the Cuban *Foco* movement, sought to avoid the time and work required to build strong infrastructures. The guerrilla force served as the party. Immediate tactical action would destroy the decadent regime and organization would follow after the guerrilla force seized power. Though *Foco* proved

successful in Cuba, it has failed wherever else it has been applied. In over twenty cases, the lack of organized infrastructures resulted in failure, when faced by resolute government action. (25:826)

Insurgents clearly viewed their own infrastructures as essential to their efforts. (5:10) At each stage of the insurgency, building the infrastructures received primary attention. Insurgents placed more value on infrastructure than on ideology or tactics. Lenin, Mao, and Ho Chi Minh led successful revolutions based on the scope, complexity, and cohesion of their infrastructures. (14:808) The common political direction, integrated plans, and discipline, provided by their infrastructures, enabled them to continue their fights. Organization compensated for material shortages. (14:808) Government responses, which did not effectively neutralize their infrastructures, could not defeat their revolutions.

THEORISTS' VIEWS ON COUNTERINSURGENCY

Many theorists have addressed insurgencies. In his monumental On War, Clausewitz wrote directly of insurgencies in his books on "Retreat to the Interior" and "People in Arms". He was the first theorist to explicitly address insurgency. (13:130) Directly or indirectly, Clausewitz provided the basis for most subsequent theories of insurgency. (23:11) Mao used Clausewitz and Sun Tzu extensively to develop a successful strategy for China's Communist Revolution. (11:45)

Like Clausewitz, Sun Tzu said much about conventional warfare, which has relevance for counterinsurgency. T.E. Lawrence amplified much of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz in writing of his insurgency efforts. Eric Hoffer and Crane Brinton gave us insights into the personalities and organizations necessary for successful infrastructures. Analysis of these works highlights for counterinsurgency operations the importance of tactically neutralizing insurgent infrastructures.

Clausewitz analyzed guerrilla warfare as a component of an insurgency (general uprising) from the point of view of the insurgent. (13:129) For him, insurgency represented the natural progression of warfare toward the absolute since the French

revolution. It "broadened and intensified" war. (6:479) Clausewitz recognized the large psychological element of insurgency. He noted that for those who employed it, insurgency gave a measure of superiority over those, who would disdain its use. (6:479) He also was the first theorist to note the politicized nature of an insurgency. (13:129)

Clausewitz viewed insurgency primarily in conjunction with conventional operations. (6:48) It was the defense of last resort against invasion. (13:129) Clausewitz felt that recourse to insurgency should be weighed carefully, because the people would suffer greatly from both enemy and insurgent action. (6:470) Sun Tzu also pointed to the extreme civil consequences of (insurgent) war- inflated prices, rates of wastage, difficulty of supply, all burdening the people. (11:40) Therefore, the very character of the people had to support this particular type of fighting. (13:131)

This great hardship to the countryside exerted a great moral impact against the insurgent. Only strong insurgent leadership and tight organization could overcome this. (6:470) Clausewitz recognized that the contravening moral impulse of the insurgent infrastructures was essential to a successful general uprising. (13:130)

Analysis of Clausewitz' key concepts for conventional warfare provides more insights for

counterinsurgency. His paradoxical trinity helps us understand the counterinsurgency environment. His discussions on the center of gravity and the sphere of influence of a victory suggest the importance of tactical neutralization of insurgent infrastructures. Clausewitz' discussion on the relative strength of defense over offense provides guidance to selection of correct counterinsurgency tactics.

Clausewitz' paradoxical trinity offers an interesting framework for analysis of the counterinsurgency problem. In conventional warfare, the people provide the passion and the will for the struggle. The army and its commander provide the genius and the creative spirit. The government provides the "element of subordination", the restraining influence, which alone subjects the process to reason. (6:89) The counterinsurgency problem has the same trinity, but their respective roles differ.

In counterinsurgency, the passions of the people form the object of the struggle not the driving force. The moral impetus (passion) for the struggle comes from the insurgent infrastructures. (13:130) The government does provide a restraining influence on its army, but not the insurgent infrastructures. The creative genius and the passion of the insurgent infrastructures roam free, but those of the Army may be severely circumscribed. Government action to correct perceived

problems can have a positive impact on the people, but their passions do not exert the driving force behind the struggle. The infrastructures, as long as they exist, provide the passion and the creative genius in the struggle for the peoples' support.

Clausewitz' concepts of center of gravity and sphere of influence of a victory also have relevance to counterinsurgency. These two concepts relate closely to one another. To successfully end a struggle, the sphere of influence of a victory or a series of victories must include the opponent's center of gravity.

For Clausewitz, the center of gravity represented those dominant factors, which composed the enemy's means of making war. It represented the opponent's cohesion. The center of gravity included only those factors, which far exceeded all others in making war. (3:484) For conventional operations, the center of gravity was normally the opponent's fighting forces, then his territory. (6:90;596)) The threat of an opponent raising new forces required the occupation of his territory.

A victory over another objective, the capital, a province, or public opinion would be decisive only if its sphere of influence included the true center of gravity- the fighting forces. The struggle would continue until a victory's center of gravity directly or indirectly removed fighting forces from the

battlefield. (6:485) Brinton confirmed this for the insurgents, when he stated that they must eventually defeat in battle or subvert the government's armed forces to win. (2:89)

The insurgency's political and military infrastructures provide its cohesion. We have already seen that the insurgents recognized this truth. Clausewitz cautioned that the major act of strategic judgment was to distinguish centers of gravity and the spheres of influence of victories of each of them. (6:486) What then should be the objective of our counterinsurgency effort? This is the most important question in counterinsurgency for as Brinton told us: insurrections succeed only where the government response is inadequate in its use of force. (2:86)

Clausewitz stated that in an insurgency, the leadership was its center of gravity, because of its effect on public opinion. (6:596) Hoffer agreed that leadership was indispensable. Though leadership needed a genuine cause, a single man with iron will, daring, and vision, could make a movement. (14:103-106) Clearly, the leadership and cohesion provided by insurgent infrastructures embody the center of gravity for an insurgency.

Clausewitz thoughts on attack and defense also provide relevant insights to the counterinsurgency problem. He accurately portrayed the insurgency as a

strategic defense. (6:482) As the inferior force, the insurgent alone benefits from the relative superiority of the defensive posture. Conversely, Clausewitz would argue that counterinsurgency forces must be offensive. "There can be no war if both sides seek to defend themselves." (6:216)

The insurgent focuses on terrain objectives, expanding his influence over the people. He avoids the clash with government forces because his goal is to spread over geography, while remaining nebulous and elusive. (13:131) Sun Tzu counseled that the weaker (insurgent) force "should move as a ghost in the starlight." (11:48) Lawrence elaborated on this theme, describing his insurgent force as an "ether". (16:7) The negative aim of this defensive strategy puts time on the side of the insurgent (6:480).

By yielding terrain when he is weak and striking only when the situation assures victory, the insurgent fulfills Sun Tzu's tenet of breaking the enemy's will before the fight. (11:39) Thus, the weaker insurgent focuses on terrain, which he can yield without permanent injury and only becomes force oriented when prospects are propitious. In this manner, the insurgent deepens the battlefield out of proportion to his numbers. (16:3) This enables the insurgent to retain the tactical initiative, even while his forces gain strength from his strategically defensive posture.

How do counterinsurgency forces arrest this advantage from the insurgent? Reliance on social change alone to eliminate legitimate grievances of the people, though required, may not be enough. (23:40) Remember, Clausewitz would argue that counterinsurgency forces must be offensive. (6:216) Often, counterinsurgency forces focus on terrain. But securing or garrisoning terrain in an attempt to hold the popular support of the people, only diffuses the strength of the counterinsurgency forces. Lawrence highlighted this with his "doctrine of acreage". (15:198) Clausewitz predicted failure for this strategy because of the increased drag, friction, and complicated tactical choices produced by large numbers of troops. (6:472)

Are counterinsurgency efforts doomed to fail? The theorists think not. Clausewitz boldly announced: "One need not hold an exaggerated faith in the power of a general uprising, nor consider it as an inexhaustible, unconquerable force, which an army can not hope to stop." (6:481) For example, if the insurgents concentrated unwisely, the army could crush it. The people would then lose heart and desert the cause. Sun Tzu agreed that the opposing force would fold quickly, once it lost the initiative. (11:50)

Counterinsurgency strategies and operations must provide for the tactical neutralization of insurgent infrastructures. These infrastructures provide the

dominant cohesive elements for the strategic, operational, and tactical direction of the insurgency. The tactical neutralization of insurgent infrastructures is required to make the counterinsurgency effort force-oriented. This alone gives the counterinsurgency forces opportunities for victories, whose sphere of influence most directly impacts on the insurgency's true center of gravity. As Clausewitz stated, "National uprising cannot maintain itself where the atmosphere is too full of danger." (6:482)

THE PARADOX OF U.S. COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE

An analysis of U. S. doctrine for insurgency/counterinsurgency yields an interesting paradox. Doctrine for U. S. support of insurgencies highlights building and sustaining insurgent infrastructures as the most important element for strategic, operational, and tactical success. (28:9-6) Conversely, U. S. counterinsurgency doctrine counsels avoidance of tactical neutralization of insurgent infrastructures. (31:2-40)

This section will illuminate this paradox by first briefly presenting U.S. doctrine for the support of insurgencies. This is found primarily in FM31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces Operations and FM100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces. Then, it will highlight counterinsurgency doctrine, emphasizing U.S. provisions for the tactical neutralization of insurgent infrastructures. U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine is primarily found in FM100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict and FM90-8, Counterguerrilla Operations.

FM31-20 and FM100-25 provide guidelines for U.S. forces deployed in support of insurgencies. Each also provides guidance for counterinsurgency operations. The paradox exists even within these manuals. It's as if those, who write on how to support an insurgency, do

not talk to those who write on counterinsurgency.

FM31-20 discusses resistance movements, orchestrated by the United States, to oppose or to overthrow an established government. The movement's goal is to cause a government withdrawal of power throughout the country. FM31-20 posits the center of gravity of a resistance movement as the people's will to resist. (28:9-2) But, the manual recognizes that insurgent infrastructures embody that will. The manual states that insurgencies do not require a just cause. Effective infrastructures and outside support will "mobilize the cause" as well as the people. (28:9-2)

Success in U.S. sponsored insurgency requires centralized direction of all strategic, operational, and tactical action combined with decentralized execution. It places high demands on organization and leadership. (28:9-7) FM100-25 stresses that U.S. sponsored insurgency focus on subversion: undermining the military, economic, psychological, and political strength of a nation. It highlights that insurgent infrastructures provide the key to all subversive activity. (32:3-4) The central issue is first control, then legitimacy. Strong infrastructures will turn what is low intensity conflict for the U.S. into total war for the resistance movement. (28:9-2)

Paradoxically, these same manuals then retreat from the importance of insurgent infrastructures, when

they discuss counterinsurgency. FM31-20 provides for direct action like sniping against individual insurgents; but, it does not discuss the systematic tactical neutralization of insurgent infrastructures. (20:11-1) FM100-25 emphasizes the need for a secure environment but eschews "tactical operations" aimed solely at destroying insurgent combat forces in their base areas. (32:3-11) Both manuals recognize the importance of insurgent infrastructures, when building an insurgency; but, they prefer to ignore or down-play tactical neutralization in the counterinsurgency arena. This theme to limit U.S. involvement in the tactical neutralization of insurgent infrastructures receives further emphasis in FM100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict.

FM100-20 seeks no U.S. involvement in the tactical neutralization of insurgent infrastructures. Such involvement would represent a transition to war from low intensity conflict and cast the United States in the role of invader. (31:2-41) Avoidance of this transition to war is apparently more important than effective counterinsurgency. For both FM100-20 and its companion volume, FM90-8, Counterguerrilla Operations, explicitly recognize the importance of infrastructures to insurgencies.

FM90-8 recognizes the importance of military and political infrastructures to direct the frustrations of

even a dissatisfied population. It states that populations in need of change are not enough for insurgency. Insurgents must only gain the passive support of the people. Therefore, the probability of insurgent success rises, if governments fail to control these infrastructures. (29:1-2)

FM100-20 agrees that insurgent leadership transforms disaffected people to an effective political and military force. (31:2-3) Denied infrastructures, the insurgency will collapse. (31:E-2) FM100-20 concedes tactical neutralization of insurgent infrastructures as an important component of the host nation's counterinsurgency strategy. But it eschews any U.S. involvement in the neutralization effort. (31:2-41)

Neither FM100-20 nor FM90-8 offers advice for the tactical neutralization of these important insurgent infrastructures. FM100-20 recommends host nation security operations to isolate and protect the people. (31:2-22) FM90-8 seeks to neutralize guerrilla forces, while ignoring insurgent infrastructures. (29:1-5) Both manuals tactically ignore what our theorists and insurgents themselves see as the insurgency's center of gravity.

In fact, FM100-20 posits the center of gravity of an insurgency as the popular support of the people, which confers legitimacy to one side or the other.

(31:2-7) It apparently seeks to treat an insurgency as an extension of the elective process. The counterinsurgency goal of FM100-20 is to defeat the infrastructures by eliminating any legitimate causes of insurgency. (31:2-13,14)

This may place U.S. counterinsurgency forces in an untenable position. U.S. doctrine for counterinsurgency may not come to grips with the insurgency's true center of gravity. At best, our doctrine recognizes the requirement for tactical neutralization of insurgent infrastructures, but seeks to avoid this necessity.

Our doctrine admits that timely discovery of insurgent infrastructures and their destruction ends the insurgency. (31:2-9) Yet paradoxically, the same doctrine limits U.S. counterinsurgency assistance to intelligence sharing, communications support, humanitarian assistance, civic action, and intertheater lift. (31:2-34)

"Destruction of the infrastructures and elimination of the conditions which cause the insurgency must be the domain of the host nation's armed forces." (31:2-41) FM100-20 makes a vague reference to "historical experience" to support this proposition. But does the historical experience of the United States and other nations involved in counterinsurgency efforts support this proposition?

The danger, if it does not, is twofold: The United

States may be ill prepared to judge the acceptability and effectiveness of tactical neutralization methods chosen by host nations. Worse, U.S. counterinsurgency efforts may fail because we have not adopted an effective doctrine for the tactical neutralization of insurgent infrastructures. The next section will analyze historical experience with the tactical neutralization of insurgent infrastructures.

CRITERIA FOR EFFECTIVE TACTICAL NEUTRALIZATION OF INSURGENT INFRASTRUCTURES

A study of selected, contemporary insurgencies yields many examples of tactical neutralization methods found necessary for successful counterinsurgency operations. These effective tactics for neutralization of insurgent infrastructures provide a criteria against which we can evaluate our own doctrine. This section presents the development of this criteria.

This section first presents an analysis of counterinsurgency efforts in general and the tactical neutralization of insurgent infrastructures specifically. Then, it reviews example neutralization tactics, organized in the following groups: separation of population from infrastructures; intelligence collection; resource control; and deterrence. Counterinsurgency forces developed these tactics in the following cases: Britain-Malaysia; France-Algeria; U.S.-Vietnam; and Britain-Northern Ireland.

These cases were selected as the contemporary examples of counterinsurgency most relevant to U.S. doctrine. France-Algeria was chosen for its general acceptance as the extreme use of tactical military force to neutralize insurgent infrastructures. Also, the French experience in Algeria directly affected our own selection of tactics in Vietnam. (1:49) U.S.

experience in Vietnam with the tactical neutralization of insurgent infrastructures required inclusion because it foreshadows our doctrine today. In fact, some authors believe that our failure in Vietnam stagnated any U.S. growth in counterinsurgency. (20:ii)

The British experience in Malaysia merited inclusion because of its common regard as the model of an established democracy successfully quashing a revolutionary insurgency. Also, Britain closely reflects the government institutions and social values of the United States. Tactical neutralization methods, used by Great Britain, may find acceptance by the United Sates. Finally, Britain-Northern Ireland was selected as an ongoing insurgency in which tactical neutralization of insurgent infrastructures has not stopped the insurgency completely, but has turned the insurgency back from a more advanced phase. Analysis of these cases provides a valid criteria for the tactical neutralization of insurgent infrastructures.

An analysis of contemporary counterinsurgency efforts provides conclusions relevant to an evaluation of our own counterinsurgency doctrine. First, each of these insurgent situations necessitated a balanced approach to counterinsurgency operations. Second, they established beyond dispute the primacy of political considerations and the importance of unitary civilian control of the total counterinsurgency effort. But most

importantly for this study, contemporary counterinsurgency operations ratified the need for a strong military effort to tactically neutralize insurgent infrastructures.

The selected counterinsurgency efforts universally endorsed a balanced civil-military approach toward combatting insurgencies. The first order of business for the incumbent government consistently remained improvement of its own political machinery and administrative capabilities. (9:64) Even hard-bitten, counterinsurgency campaigners in Algeria admitted that securing the population's confidence required more than military force. (27:11)

Britain's successful counterinsurgency efforts in Malaysia proved invaluable the integration of civil administration, armed forces, and police into a coordinated team with a unified plan. (22:7) Our own experience in Vietnam confirmed this. Some French military accounts of the Algerian insurrection disputed this necessity; but, more thoughtful French observers advocated an integrated civilian and military staff lead by a civilian. (9:90) Although most contemporary counterinsurgency efforts stressed a balanced counterinsurgency approach under civilian control, they also elaborated on the need for tactical neutralization of insurgent infrastructures as a very important part of that balanced.

Insurgent infrastructures provided all resources for the insurgency in addition to its strategic, operational, and tactical direction. As the sole procurers and distributors of personnel, food, and arms, the insurgent infrastructures became the first target for elimination. (26:31) The fight for popular support started here.

In Malaysia and Algeria popular support began with safety, not good will. The first priority of the counterinsurgency effort became protection, rather than assistance. (9:14) Propaganda and even civil works were ineffective absent a proven ability to protect. (27:49) Most counterinsurgent forces found that the goodwill of the people directly related to the government's resolve to protect them. (26:146) They found that the people excused normally intolerable measures, if they proved effective. (26:147)

The necessary corollary to this was that no effective measure hurt the people more than the insurgents. For example, large scale "search and clear" tactics proved ineffective in Malaysia and Vietnam because they normally created more insurgents than they killed. (26:35) Even in Algeria, counterinsurgency forces learned to reject tactics, which did not promote positive contact with the people. (27:73) In Ireland the British developed habitual relationships between specific units and regional populations. (12:167)

Successful counterinsurgency tactics avoided collateral damage. Rarely did counterinsurgent forces profit from the use of artillery or close air support. (9:93)

Counterinsurgency tactics needed to be offensive and they also needed to threaten insurgent infrastructures to be effective. The goal of offensive counterinsurgency tactics was to force insurgents to focus on subsistence and protection of their infrastructures. (26:117) To do this, counterinsurgents developed effective tactics in four major categories: separation of population from infrastructures; intelligence collection; resource control; and deterrence. Furthermore, as the France-Algeria experience proved, effective tactics had to be responsive to the law of war and the counterinsurgent nation's political sensibilities.

The population required physical, psychological, and political separation from the insurgent infrastructures. Physical separation normally began with a complete census of the population and identification documentation. (9:94) Since youngsters were often used as couriers, counterinsurgent forces in Algeria issued picture identification cards to all civilians over eleven years of age. The counter-insurgent forces then posted each building with picture documentation of its inhabitants. (26:144) This began the psychological separation of the population from the

insurgent infrastructures.

Family heads were held accountable for the activities of their families or those who lived in their buildings. (27:29) In Malaysia and Algeria this focus on fixing responsibility initiated the positive involvement of the people with the counterinsurgent authorities. (10:119) Counterinsurgent forces progressively increased the requirements of the population for self protection until the people became full partners in the counterinsurgency effort. For example, in Malaysia local populations were organized to fix damage resulting from insurgent sabotage. Once physical and psychological separation had begun, political separation became effective.

Counterinsurgent forces used civic action to hold areas that were tactically cleared by the military. Increased civic action also dampened harsher physical separation measures. Relocation of populations or military fortification of strategic hamlets garnered acceptance by the people, if accompanied by better living conditions. In rural Malaysia, strategic hamlets succeeded in separating the populations physically, psychologically, and politically. Strategic hamlets failed in Vietnam because their locations did not proceed from a secure, strategic base. They also failed because insurgent infrastructures were locked into the hamlets with the people, rather than neutralized

tactically. (26:141)

The most concerted effort to tactically neutralize insurgent infrastructures in Vietnam failed because its focus perverted to body counts, leaving insurgent infrastructures in tact. (21:46) The Phoenix Program, much maligned in fiction, consisted of a four-pronged, integrated approach to neutralize insurgent infrastructures: an intelligence program to identify; a tactical program to apprehend; a legal program to restrain; and a detention program to confine. (21:27) Failures like Phoenix in Vietnam did not negate; however, the requirement for intelligence collection focused on neutralizing infrastructures.

Once securely separated from insurgent infrastructures, people in Malaysia and Algeria began to feed counterinsurgent forces tactical information. The primary essential element of information for tactical neutralization of insurgent infrastructures was the name of the insurgent's next higher cell member. (7:76) But, French tactical intelligence collection activities in Algeria relied heavily on torture. This proved counterproductive. Other nations found that specially trained interrogators could legally extract confessions, once they rejected abusive practices and the notion of unconditional surrender. (22:8) Infrastructure members were more easily "turned" if rigorously examined but treated well and offered

conditional amnesty. (21:61) The intelligence supplied by a secure population enabled counterinsurgent forces to tactically control required insurgent resources.

The inability to produce resources, especially food and arms, constituted an inherent insurgent weakness. Expanding the census to include farm animals and transport modes, counterinsurgents successfully used food denial as a weapon in Malaysia and Algeria. (22:8) With convoys and other controls on bulk foods, counterinsurgents forced insurgents to subsistence levels. (26:144) Movement control of the population combined with food rationing prevented insurgent infrastructures from supplying their forces. (22:94) Sometimes success required draconian measures. Rice was cooked before rationing, so it would spoil if saved; and likewise, canned goods were punctured. But a safe population tolerated these measures and counter-insurgent forces easily "turned" coerced smugglers. (26:146) In fact, the tolerance of safe populations seemed stretched only by deterrence tactics.

Burning villages, massive roundups, and concentration camps, like massive collateral damage from high-tech weapons, created more insurgents than they eliminated in Algeria. (7:23) Neither torture of suspects nor reprisal demolitions of homes impacted on insurgent infrastructures. (7:46) Even British internment of IRA suspects without trial precipitated

adverse reaction from the population with no concomitant impact on infrastructures. (17:86) More humane collective punishments- curfews, restricted shopping hours, nuisance patrols- needed to be carefully controlled and expeditiously curtailed to remain effective. (22:54)

Contemporary counterinsurgencies have required the balanced approach advocated by the U.S. Internal Defense and Development Strategy. The experience of other nations confirmed the wisdom of a unified counterinsurgency effort under civilian control. But for each counterinsurgency studied, tactical neutralization of insurgent infrastructures formed an important part of that balanced approach. Effective neutralization tactics conformed to the law of war and fell into four categories: separation of the population from the insurgents; intelligence collection; resource control; and deterrence.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine does not effectively neutralize insurgent infrastructures. Paradoxically, our doctrine recognizes the critical importance of insurgent infrastructures for the centralized strategic, operational, and tactical direction of the insurgency. But under the Internal Defense and Development strategy, we relegate tactical neutralization of these infrastructures to host nation forces. This presents two dangers: First, U.S. military forces have no frame of reference for the effectiveness of neutralization tactics, which may be employed by host nation forces. Second, we are not prepared to execute our own neutralization program if required by host nation failure.

Resolution of this paradox may require doctrinal change. Our doctrine states that avoidance of tactical neutralization of insurgent infrastructures is based on historic experience. However, the historical, counterinsurgency experience of other nations does not support this contention. Even our own experience in Vietnam belies our doctrine today. The counter-insurgency specialist, Edward Landsdale, cited Phoenix as a failure because it was implemented amateurishly and strayed from systematic infrastructure neutralization. (21:65)

U.S. military doctrine for counterinsurgency complements the Internal Defense and Development strategy. Like other nations, the United States recognizes the need for a balanced counterinsurgency approach with a unified plan, directed by civilian leadership. Unlike other nations, we apparently have removed the tactical neutralization of insurgent infrastructures from this balanced approach. This may require rethinking because of the importance of insurgent infrastructures.

Insurgent infrastructures provide strategic, operational, and tactical direction for insurgencies. Furthermore, these infrastructures procure and distribute all personnel, food, and arms for the insurgency. Clearly, these infrastructures embody the most important source of cohesion for the entire insurgency effort.

We have seen that theorists and insurgents alike cite this focal point of cohesion as a center of gravity. Cohesive infrastructures enable insurgents to flow from one phase of insurgency to another, putting time on the side of the insurgent. Insurgent infrastructures may even embody the single center of gravity, which successful counterinsurgents must influence with their victories. These infrastructures provide the insurgent's capability to retain the tactical initiative, while gaining strength through the

strategic defensive.

To arrest the insurgent's initiative, we must find an effective way to take the tactical offensive. Neutralization of insurgent infrastructures would provide us tactical victories, which also would have great operational and strategic impact. Tactical neutralization of infrastructures would help to remove the benefit of time from the insurgents by precluding their ability to flow from one phase of insurgency to another. Effective neutralization tactics would force the insurgents to concentrate their inferior forces to protect their infrastructures in a battle for their existence.

These effective tactics for infrastructure neutralization must not cause collateral damage among the population. They must conform to the rule of law and promote positive contact between the armed forces and the people. Historically, counterinsurgent forces have developed successful neutralization tactics in the following categories: separation of the people from the insurgents; intelligence collection; resource control; and deterrence. Successful tactics enabled the counterinsurgents to become force-oriented, rather than terrain-oriented.

The first three categories of neutralization tactics remove from the insurgents benefit derived from Lawrence's "doctrine of acreage". Tactics, which imply

garrisoning territory, should be rejected. Counter-insurgency forces must provide safety for the population, through the tactical neutralization of insurgent infrastructures. A safe population normally becomes active in its support for the counterinsurgency. The safe population's support can be reinforced and expanded through civic action. This highlights the civil-military balance required for successful counterinsurgency efforts.

The fourth category of tactics, deterrence, requires special attention. Most forms of deterrence, used in counterinsurgency, are illegal and repugnant to American values. These should be carefully proscribed. Some evenly applied collective punishments, like curfews or restricted shopping hours, may find acceptance with a population convinced of the government's honest resolve to protect. But, even relatively benign restrictions may prove counter-productive. Neutralization tactics aimed at deterrence may have no place in U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine; however, "balance" in counterinsurgency may still require the effective tactical neutralization of insurgent infrastructures.

If so, U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine must more accurately reflect this balanced approach. Current doctrine emphasizes civic action for the resolution of insurgent situations. Though civic action should

receive primacy, military action for the tactical neutralization of insurgent infrastructures must not be neglected. Our counterinsurgency doctrine should explicitly delineate effective and acceptable neutralization tactics. We must explicitly develop acceptable and effective tactics for separation of the insurgents from the population, intelligence collection, and resource control.

The highly politicized nature of counterinsurgency warfare makes this especially important. Improvisation of effective neutralization tactics may prove impossible. Doctrinally approved, effective tactics would reduce the possibility of error in support of host nation neutralization efforts. More importantly, doctrinally approved, effective neutralization tactics may prevent our own failure in future counterinsurgency situations. Doctrine, which eschews this necessity, may proscribe failure for future U.S. counterinsurgency efforts.

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